


MIGRANTS IN WESTERN EUROPE: DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

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INTRODUCTION

This paper does not aim at covering all aspects of immigration into and integration of immigrants in Western Europe. This would mean a virtually impossible task involving thousands of pages. This paper will first present the latest developments concerning their demographic presence in Europe, then it will concentrate on some issues related to socio-economic indicators of integration, by focusing on immigrants coming from North Africa and Turkey. Why only these two groups are investigated? Most of the immigrants coming from the “Third World” into Western Europe originate from North Africa and Turkey.




Source: Adapted from Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, Strasbourg, 2006. The most populous countries are considered: i.e. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain.

Figure 1
Migrants in Western Europe by regions of origin in percent, 2005

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In the case of France this composition of migrants is clear. But let us have a look at Germany. In this country where East meets West, it is noteworthy that a large majority, two-thirds come from Turkey and North Africa. Their number largely exceeds those originating from non-EU Eastern Europe: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bosnia etc. The United Kingdom is an exception in this respect as the most important migrant groups are from India, Pakistan and the West Indies and increasingly from newly accessing EU countries.



Source: Adapted from Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, Strasbourg, 2006. The most populous countries are considered: i.e. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain

Figure 2
Third World migrants in Western Europe by regions of origin, 2005

The three countries of North Africa and Turkey, count some 10 millions of immigrants or descendants of immigrants in Western Europe, due to the compounded effects of immigration and fertility. Most have settled there, formed families and had children. Many have got different European citizenships, thus they have disappeared from aliens' statistics.

Needless to say, in spite of somehow modest figures, in view of the size of the host or origin populations, the subject of immigration and integration/assimilation/insertion of the non EU immigrants of North African and Turkish background has stimulated tremendous intellectual and journalistic activity, partly justified by the key role played by immigration on the anti-

pated demographic growth in the future, and by its emotional impact, with the easy shortcut done between immigration, Islam and terrorism.

CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION

Integration is a widely used concept by migration specialists to describe the mechanisms by which an incomer becomes part of the national fabric, stays apart or he/she is excluded. Specialists use also the concept of assimilation, considered as a definite renunciation to the social and cultural specificities of the immigrant groups for the adoption of the norms and values of the host country. Insertion, refers to a kind of minimal cooperation between immigrants and the host society.

Since integration (and assimilation) covers all aspects of human life, the list of indicators which should be tackled with to measure to which extent the immigrants are becoming part of the mainstream population, is infinite. It would go from the mere vital aspects of life such as birth, death, marriage, divorce, to more elusive ones, such as performance at school, economic activity and unemployment, housing segregation, income generation. Besides there are some aspects of integration which are even more difficult to capture on the basis of hard data: deviance, xenophobia, racism in one or another setting, increasing the difficulty to compare data. Even the comparison of the simplest features, such as the demographic dynamics and structures may raise more questions than give answer.

This is due to the lack of comparability in data and diversity in their sources. In the six countries where significant numbers of immigrants coming from North Africa and Turkey live (say over 100 thousand persons), In France researchers rely mainly on population censuses and some nationwide surveys. In Belgium we can study the population of immigrant background through a mixture of censuses, population register and small scale surveys, whereas in the Netherlands analysts rely mainly on population registers. In Germany population censuses are the main sources while in Italy and Spain there is a mixture of statistics.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS OF INTEGRATION

Understanding the demographic dynamics of immigrants in Europe, the convergences and divergences with their host countries and of their countries of origin is an inescapable step in evaluating their integration.

Mortality and causes of death

There are some studies on differential mortality among immigrants and the core population. However no systematic conclusion can be drawn, only presumptions to be tested:

- Differentials are lower and sometimes more in favour of the immigrant population in “pro-assimilation” countries such as France, as compared to multiculturalist ones (as it can be exemplified by childhood mortality of Moroccans in France and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom (Coleman et al. 2002). The benefit of lower mortality among first generation immigrants tends to erode when the second generation is analysed (migrants with Turkish and Moroccan background in Belgium, Norway (Compton and Courbage 2002).
- In countries less in favour of assimilation (Switzerland, Belgium) some unacceptable cultural features are exacerbated such as excess female mortality among immigrants with Turkish or Kosovar background.

Data related to mortality and morbidity are clearly fundamental to assess the well-being of immigrants and therefore they are important indicators of social cohesion, showing the respective levels of integration or exclusion. The subject matter is complex and only a handful of studies have endeavoured to measure mortality and causes of deaths among immigrants. Most studies did not distinguish individual groups and had to pool immigrants or foreigners altogether, which puts strong limits onto the analysis.

A number of factors might explain the differential mortality often observed between immigrants and indigenous populations: selection of migrants in good health on arrival or selection of those in poor health on departure together with differences in living conditions and access to health services in the host country.

In France, a study on the mortality and cause of deaths of Moroccan citizens (non-naturalized) was based on civil registration and census data. Algerians could not be studied because of the difficulties to distinguish who is Algerian and who is not in France and Tunisians because of the few numbers in deaths occurrences, due to the small size of their community. Relying on a mixture of direct and indirect methods, the classical indicators of mortality were estimated. Life expectancy was found to be higher among males 73.7 years in 1980–90, thus two years above the French average whereas Moroccan females in France and French women had almost the same life expectancy. Besides, they were much ahead of Morocco itself, with a life expectancy exceeding by ten years the one prevailing in the country of birth. These counter intuitive results – there is a downward selection of the Moroccan immigrants at

the bottom of the social ladder – show a high degree of integration and convergence with the indicators of the host country. The selection factor – only persons in good health do move – is eroding with the passing of time. This lower mortality is due to the conjunction of an efficient health system (French life expectancy at birth is among the highest in the world) and of a life style inherited from the country of origin, which favours lower mortality (more vegetables and less fat in their diet, lower alcohol intake, more physical exercises). Among children, infant, under-five or below 20 years of age, mortality was cut to a tenth of its Moroccan average: the probability of dying between birth and the age of 20 during the eighties, was 16.6 per thousand among Moroccan citizens living in France as compared to 160 per thousand in the rural areas of Morocco from where most of the out migration flows come (Souss in the South and Rif in the North)², and 16.1 per thousand among the young French

The same can be said for Belgium where foreign males have a life expectancy 0.6 years higher and foreign females 0.5 years higher than their Belgian counterparts. There is also a lower level of mortality among immigrants from Morocco in Belgium, particularly the males, which is not the result of a bias caused by the selective return of those in poor health to their countries of origin. It also appears that second generation immigrants benefit less from lower mortality than the first.

Infant and child mortality offer better indicators since they are not subject to effects of selection. In Belgium between 1993 and 1998, infant and child mortality (0–4 age group) among immigrants from Morocco was 68% above the corresponding Belgium figures. Moreover, mortality among young Moroccan girls was 39% higher (13% among Turkish immigrants), displaying a clear gender bias (since the normal rate is 30% lower for girls than for boys).

In Switzerland (1988–93), life expectancy was higher among foreign males, than for Swiss nationals: 77 against 74 years, as well as for females: 83.3 against 80. Yet, there is a gender bias in childhood among immigrants from Turkey: 12% excess mortality in the case of girls.

Causes of death have been mainly studied with regard to immigrants from Morocco in France. They have shown that with the exception of deaths from injuries and poisoning, Moroccan immigrant men have higher mortality than French citizens only in the case of congenital anomalies and tuberculosis, and lower concerning most of the different cancers and diseases from the circulatory system. As compared to French citizens Moroccan women die more frequently of congenital anomalies and tuberculosis, cancers diabetes, diseases of the circulatory system and much more frequently due to maternal mortality. Moroccan immigrant adults of both sex commit less frequently suicide, but

² Direction de la Statistique, *Enquête démographique nationale 1986-88 : la mortalité au Maroc*, Rabat, 1990.

young girls are nonetheless formulate a high risk group. Both sexes and age groups show very strong excess mortality from “other violent deaths”.

Factors that protect this immigrant population are low alcohol consumption and a diet rich in fruit and vegetables. As a contrast high sugar consumption increases deaths due to diabetes. Congenital anomalies can be linked to consanguineous marriages. Tuberculosis is a social marker. The same pattern appears among immigrants from Portugal in Switzerland (tuberculosis), AIDS and infectious diseases for Turks in the Netherlands, Africans in the UK (Compton and Courbage 2002).

Fertility

Either openly or in more coded form, fertility ranks – with illegal migration – as a measurement often used in the debate on the integration of migrants into European societies. Some do not hesitate to extrapolate differences between the fertility of emigrants (from North Africa or Turkey or more generally of the overall Moslem population) and their hosts far into the future. This leads to predictions that the former could become the majority in their host countries. As an example there was a paper presented at the IUSSP conference in Beijing in 1997, where two German scholars concluded on the basis of a sophisticated mathematical model that the 8.8% of foreigners – mainly of Turkish origin – would become the majority of the population in Germany in the next century (Steinman and Jager 1997).


As opposed to this approach, convergence between the fertility rates of immigrants, on the one hand, and those of their host populations and populations of origin, on the other, are seen as key aspects of integration. This might be a direct or indirect effect of education. Satisfactory schooling achievement is correlated to the number of children in households, and thus to fertility.

Recent data on the fertility of immigrants is limited. In France, where their presence is the largest the results of the 1999 census on foreigners have not yet been published fully and those of the survey “Etude de l’histoire familiale” of the same year 1999 might seem a bit outdated in view of the tremendous changes in fertility behaviour. Besides, civil registration of births by citizenship of the mother is misleading, because of the acquisition by foreign nationals of the host country's nationality. Hence, fertility of foreigners is reflecting less and less the fertility of immigrants coming from North Africa and Turkey.

In France, historical trends might be determined for the three communities coming from the Maghreb: Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, but less for those coming from Turkey, whose numbers are lower. International comparisons on the contrary, are limited to the ones coming from Morocco and Turkey in some European countries where their presence is important. (Contrariwise, in quanti-

tative terms the presence of Algerian and Tunisian immigrants is negligible elsewhere than in France.)

Fertility rates of immigrant women have been constantly falling from 1962 until 1999. The decline has affected Diaspora communities and countries of origin alike, with the onset of demographic transition occurring even earlier in the immigrant communities. A link can be established between these demographic transitions on the two shores of the Mediterranean. Hence, North African immigrants have partly accelerated fertility transition in their country of origin. The lone migrants of the 1960's, unmarried workers travelling without their families and being unclear about their ultimate plans concerning their return to the country of birth or settling in the host country – were assuredly imbued with a single inherited family model – the pro-natalist model – the very model which dominated in their countries of origin. They would certainly have aspired to have as many children as if they had never left their villages. But the effect of disruptions on ultimate family size due to emigration constrained real aspirations. A generation later, a society has been born out of immigration whose values are no longer strictly congruent with those of the founding fathers. While not yet fully integrated into the host society with the clear exception of the so-called *Beurgeoisie*, the upper class of *Beur* or people with North African origin, its representatives have a realistic, perhaps even disabused, assessment of the radical development which sets them apart from their fellow countrymen who remained in the southern shore of the Mediterranean. But being different does not entail absolute alienation. Relative proximity, cheap travel and low costs of communication have favoured the proliferation of networks of interchanges in the Mediterranean perhaps more than between any other expatriate community and the region of origin. Immigrants from North Africa and Turkey generate substantial flows of funds, which are both essential to their families and the national balances of payments. Through redistribution of earnings and consumer durables whose acquisition they facilitate or which they regularly introduce, emigrants induce profound changes in the patterns of consumption. Consciously or unconsciously, they encourage aspirations for improved conditions and a reconsideration of the net value, costs and benefits of children. Moreover, the close links they maintain with their home country have enabled them to contribute to the increasingly rapid changes in fertility in the countries of origin themselves, thanks to their transfer of remittances and, above all, values, which have led to a preference for later marriage and reduced family size. Surveys in rural areas have shown that school attendance of children is higher among families linked to migrants abroad and that differences in schooling among boys and girls are insignificant (Courbage 1995).



Source: Based on French civil registration 1960–1999 (thus concerns foreigners of these nationalities only and not the naturalised among them).

Figure 3
Total fertility rate among various groups of immigrants in France, 1960–2000

French data on foreigners (non-naturalised North African citizens or people of Turkish origin thus affected by an upward bias since they are more fertile than the naturalized) show a rapid pace of fertility transition. TFR has been brought down from 7 children or more per women by the end of the sixties to 3.4 to 3.5 in 1990. In 1996–1998 it stood at 2.82 for Moroccans 2.87 for Algerians, 2.68 for Tunisians, and thus less than in the countries of origin: 2.91 in Morocco, 3.08 in Algeria and 2.37 in Tunisia. If extrapolated these results would signify that fertility of non-naturalized Maghrebines in France is now (by 2007) in the vicinities of the replacement level.





Figure 4

Fertility of Moroccan immigrants in France, Belgium and the Netherlands

The last French survey on family, enables a more refined fertility estimation for immigrants taking into account the duration of stay (Toulemon 2004). Hence, in 1991–1998, (13 years ago), the refined TFR were for immigrant women:

of Algerian origin	2.57
of Moroccan origin	2.97
of Tunisian origin	2.90
of Turkish origin	3.21



Source: Graph established on basis of the different chapters of Werner Haug, Paul Compton, Youssef Courbage (Haug, Compton and Courbage 2002 ...ouv.cit. except for France).

Figure 5

Total fertility rate of immigrants coming from Turkey in different European countries 1981–1999

In other European countries, the high pace of the North African fertility transition is also confirmed (data are limited to immigrants coming from Morocco due to the tiny size of the other Maghreb communities). Total fertility rate fell from 5.7 to 3.9 in Belgium between 1981 and 1994, and from 4.9 to 3.29 in the Netherlands between 1990 and 1999. However, it is worth noting that current fertility in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway is higher than in Morocco, where it had fallen to 2.4 children in 2004, and also among immigrants from Morocco in France. This raises intriguing questions, although answers must be deferred, since the information available is fragmentary. Some of the difference is to be explained by variations in the different areas of departure as well as the length of settlement in the host country. But attitudes in the host country towards migrants should not be ignored. Hence, in more multicultural countries such as the Netherlands, Norway or Belgium, the fertility of foreign nationals may be less likely to follow that of the host country as a model while at the same time also distinguishing itself from that of the country of origin. It is noticeable, in this respect, that in Belgium, the fertility of Moroccan immigrants is higher in Flanders, closer to the multicultural pattern of the Nether-

lands than in the Walloons and Brussels, prone to the French pattern of assimilation.

The case of the immigrants coming from Turkey in Europe is somehow different and very intriguing. Although originating from a country where fertility has never been too high (comparatively to Arabic Middle Eastern countries), Turkish fertility transition outside the country appears to be stagnating. One of the reasons behind this situation is probably the heterogeneity of the so-called Turkish immigrants. They include in fact fairly significant numbers of Kurdish people, who still preserve their traditional customs and a very high fertility. In the country of origin, Southern Anatolia, mainly populated by Kurds had a TFR of 4.19 in 2001–2003 at the latest fertility survey, hence twice the national average of 2.23 and 2.3 times more than the population in Istanbul. For political and economic reasons Kurds, rarely identified as such in censuses and surveys, are more inclined than other Turkish citizens to emigrate.

However, in spite of this Kurdish hyper fertility the transition is rapid in Germany and Switzerland, but less so in Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Norway. In this later places there is no definite trend toward replacement level or below, such as what we observe in Turkey or for the Northern Africans immigrants. Geographical origin, socio-economic status, the length of stay and the policy of the host country all contribute to fertility behaviour and leads to a somewhat confused picture of the relevant level and trends. A certain closeness of the Turkish immigrants by contrast to the North African might also contribute to the stagnation in their fertility transition. The scarcity of mixed marriages and the low level in the acquisition of the language in the host country are noteworthy.

Illegitimate births and adolescent fertility: Given the opprobrium that accompanies illegitimate births in North Africa and Turkey, it is rather surprising to discover that these events do occur among nationals of these countries, even if the proportion is well below that of the host country. In Switzerland, 4% of births among Turks were illegitimate, a figure reached by their countrymen in Belgium (1994) and Germany (2001). In France in 1999, 8.4% births among Tunisian mothers, to 13% among Moroccans and 19.5% among Algerian were births outside wedlock. Among Moroccans, in Belgium and the Netherlands – about 2.6% – the proportion are lower, meaning a slower pace of “convergence” of immigrant patterns to the norms of the host country. Data available for the Netherlands and the UK provides information on one of the main risk factors for the health of mother and child, namely fertility among adolescents. In the Netherlands 10% and 7% of the births of adolescents were to mothers born respectively in Turkey and Morocco, thus there is a certain overrepresentation.

In the case of fertility, the extent to which Maghreb and Turkish immigrant groups are integrated may be judged either in terms of whether fertility has

fallen to the replacement level or whether it has dropped to the extremely low levels recorded in the European host populations. Nonetheless there are some ambiguities in this respect. In France, for instance a TFR among North African immigrants almost equal to replacement level is a very likely scenario in a matter of years, if not already attained, and thus an important criteria of integration is already fulfilled. Contrariwise, we cannot expect the Turkish TFR in Germany, to reach the extremely low German TFR of 1.3. Convergence (and integration) needs an increase of the German TFR to reasonable levels rather than the decrease of the Turkish one.

Marriage patterns

Nuptiality can be regarded as an important criterion of integration. Especially mixed marriages can be treated as a major step forward in the process of integration.

The first important aspect is the origin of the partner. In France, intermarriage can be analysed on the basis of civil registration (the last published years are 1998 and 1999), which provides a nationwide although biased picture. Or preferably we can utilise 1992 and 1999 surveys. This set of data is too old and should certainly be revised. Marriage between migrants from Algeria, Morocco and French "natives", *Français de souche*, was more frequent than expected. The difference with other migrant groups such as the groups more inclined to endogamy such as immigrants from Turkey, especially among females is striking. Courting habits show the impact of the host society: one out of two Algerian boy and one out of three Algerian girls has a boy/girl friend who is *Français de souche*.

In Belgium, the proportion of mixed marriages involving a Belgian and a foreign national increased from 4 to 12% between 1970 and 1997 for Moroccans. Among immigrants from Turkey the increase was only from 1 to 3%, an increase much lower than observed in France. In the Netherlands, endogamy of the Moroccan immigrants is pronounced. The 1999 population registers show that only 5% of Moroccan immigrants have been married to Dutch women. Among women born in Morocco the percentages married to a Dutch husband are even lower. In Norway, in the second generation of immigrants from Morocco are more open than their women with regard to mixed marriages.

In Germany, the statistics of mixed marriages are very limited. Yet, by dividing the number of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants marrying with German women or men, one can get a rough idea of the differentials in 1998:

Table 1
Number of mixed marriages per 100 inhabitants, Germany, 1998

	Foreign wife	Foreign husband	Sex ratio
Immigrant			
from Turkey	0,12	0,40	3.3
from Morocco	0,69	1,62	2.3
from Morocco/Turkey	5,6	4,1	

Source: Mammey and Shwarz 2002. p. 233.

One could think that the supposedly religious tradition of early and universal marriage among males and especially among females as prescribed by the *Quran* would persist on this side of the Mediterranean sea among immigrants from the Maghreb. In fact, there are no clearly defined patterns. In France, somehow outdated figures show that the pattern of early marriage already disappeared a decade ago, with 74% of the Algerian, 68% of the Moroccans and 59% of the females aged 20–24 years still being unmarried. Contrariwise, the early age at marriage of women from Morocco in Belgium – a mean age of 21 years in 1997 – contrasts with the very rapid increase of age at marriage in Morocco itself (a singulate mean age at marriage around 28 years for females in 1998). In the Netherlands, their average age at marriage was 23.5 years between 1995 and 1999, while the mean difference between spouses was almost 5 years.

Immigration and place of marriage: The closure of frontiers with regard to legal immigration in the mid-1970s led to the adoption of marriage as part of a strategy to get around the new restrictions, thus increasing the difficulty of establishing unbiased marriage patterns for immigrants. Data that enable us to study immigration after establishing marriage is available for only two countries. In the case of Belgium, an examination of the population registers shows that 62% of immigrants from Morocco were not recorded in the civil status registers, because their marriages took place in their country of origin or at a consulate. This would suggest that a significant proportion of marriages by Moroccan immigrants not only took place prior to immigration, but that marriage was ahead of work as a factor behind immigration, accounting for 12% of Moroccan arrivals between 1992 and 1996.

Intergenerational changes: Only in Norway there has been investigations concerning differences between the second and first generation immigrants in this respect. It appears that traditional marriage customs are receding. Proportion of women getting married early is much lower in the 2nd generation: 9% than in the first generation: 50%. This figure is based mainly on the group of

immigrants coming from Pakistan, but might be applied as well to the other Muslim groups.

Divorce: Are divorces more likely among couples of mixed origins? Are differences of traditions and cultures more pregnant? Or the solidarity of the couple is stronger in front of a hostile environment? There is also the problem of the unconsummated marriages, which are almost automatically dissolved as soon as one of the partner immigrates or he/she is naturalized.

The signals are very mixed. In Switzerland divorce among immigrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia is less frequent than among Swiss citizens or Moroccan immigrants in Belgium as compared to Belgian citizens. In contrast, Germany and the Netherlands, seems to display a more fragile picture of mixed marriages between immigrants from Turkey and German citizens (54% divorces of German wife from a Turkish husband against 18% of German husband from a Turkish wife).

Household structures

The dominant forms of social grouping among Maghreb immigrants are households. Household indicators are also useful for assessing integration. For example, shifts in household size might indicate changing customs, as observed with regard to fertility trends (number of children in the household) and notions of the extended family (sharing with grandparents or the presence of other persons). In France, nuclear households were the dominant form in the community (among aliens and naturalized French people): 17% of the Algerian immigrant, 13% of the Moroccan immigrants and 12% of the Tunisian immigrant households were one person households, whereas 55%, 61% and 57% were family households with two parents and their children. In Belgium, the adaptation of immigrant households is also well advanced. 9% of Moroccan immigrants live in one person households, while collective households are relatively uncommon, accounting for 7% of the Moroccan immigrant population totals. We note also that only 1.9% of Moroccan immigrants are found in three-generation households, generally considered to be "traditional". In 1998, the average household size among Moroccan immigrants was 5.0 persons as compared to 3.1 for Belgian citizens – with numbers of children in the household (fertility) and the presence of other adults counter balancing each other. In the Netherlands, the average size of Moroccan immigrant households is 3.8 persons, being almost twice larger than among natives.

Age and sex structures

Transformations of age and sex structure also reflect the various phases in the integration of immigrant communities. Thus the migration of male workers was increasingly followed by migration with the purposes of family reunion, which eventually supplanted the former when Europe's borders were closed to foreign workers in 1974. The dependency ratio – the sum of the number of children under 20 and persons aged 65 or above as reflected onto the number of persons of working age – shows how the age structure gradually acquires a non-immigrant profile.

In Belgium, in 1998, the sex ratio dropped to 107 among Moroccan immigrants. In the Netherlands, changes in the age pyramids between 1990 and 1999 highlight the long-term adjustment process, as the early immigration of active males later gives way to that of families. This is also seen to be matched by significant short-term effects among Moroccan immigrants, involving a decline in the proportion of children as a result of lower fertility, and a rise in the proportion aged 55 and over, owing to the ageing of immigrants who are increasingly less inclined to return to their countries of origin.

The dominant form of the North African and Turkish immigrant groupings, which are now reflected in their age-sex structure as well in their households characteristics, are likely to influence their level of integration. But in what direction? In the 1970s it was thought that the tendency of non-European immigrants keeping their spouses and children in the home country and live alone or in collective households was an insurmountable barrier to their integration. The adult migrant was there just to make his living, to work and to make savings to enhance the living standards of his family in his home country. Nowadays, after the process of family reunification, which started in the middle of the 70's, there is a view that family type households might prevent integration, because the reconstitution of families and the presence of the wife recreates the conditions for the exercise of patriarchal authority and the continuation of the traditions of the country of origin.

At this point, it is obvious on the basis of the demographic study of immigrants that they have gone a long way through a convergence towards the characteristics of the host countries, therefore through an integration process. Yet, once they have become established in the host country and net immigration has declined to a trickle, their age and sex structure is subject only to the effects of fertility and mortality. Thus, once generations have been reunited, and wives are no longer separated from their immigrant husbands and children are close to their parents and grandparents, immigrant groups are in all respects settled communities in their adopted countries. However, what is not yet clear is whether, in the longer term, this will take the form of integration and assimilation into the general population, or whether it is a first step towards the consti-

tution of minorities that are self-contained demographically in the sense that they are able to grow and flourish autonomously.

One of the keys in answering this question should be found in marriage behaviour. If a situation comes about whereby demographic self-sufficiency leads to the overwhelming predominance of intra-group marriages/unions the tendency could well be towards the creation of new national minorities that are culturally, socially as well as demographically self contained. If on the other hand, the level of interaction with host populations and other groups of immigrant origin is substantial and results in significant numbers of mixed-marriages/unions this would suggest that the tendency is towards integration and assimilation.

At this point, the demography of North African and Turkish immigrants shows that integration and convergence has progressed rather rapidly. But unfortunately, social and economic components display a much less rosy picture.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF INTEGRATION

Schooling and educational attainment

One of the key issue of integration is the low educational attainment of the immigrant population coming from Maghreb and Turkey in Europe compared both to the standards of the host country as well as of the country of origin.


The level of education of the immigrants is still lower than in the native country. After decades of emigration to Europe, their educational standards clearly display that they were selected at the bottom of the social ladder.

However, there is a significant improvement in the educational attainment. It might be due to an automatic replacement of the less educated older generations by younger ones or this might be the effect of literacy campaigns or of out of school programs targeted towards the migrant population.

More interestingly, these statistics do depict the emergence of a new and powerful intelligentsia inside this Diaspora, the great strides accomplished by these communities, among the North African the genesis of a *Beurgeoisie*, thanks to the educational accomplishments of the new generations, born in Europe or recently immigrating. This trend got momentum during the last decade, particularly after 1992 with the outbreak of the civil war in Algeria.

Refined data like those of special surveys or panels, show that ethnic origin might play a lesser role than socio-professional category in explaining success or failure at school or at the university. The role of parents is crucial, namely the way they look positively or negatively on the performance of their children at school. Success stories are mainly found where the father has a stable job, where distance towards the community of origin and the ability to communicate

in French are higher, and, last but not least, where household size and the number of children at home are (hence fertility is low).




Source: Based on Meurs, Pailhé and Simon 2005.

Figure 7
Educational attainment of immigrants in the second generation by countries of origin, both sexes, France, 1999

Thus recent data from the French family survey (*enquête famille*) of 1999, shows a steep decline in the use of Maghreb, Arabic and Berber languages to the benefit of the French. Hence, 55–60% of the fathers who used to listen to their own father using those languages in their childhood, do not communicate with their children anymore in this language. On the contrary, among Turkish immigrants the rate of erosion of the Turkish (or Kurdish) language is only about 15%.

Large and panel surveys are at odds concerning whether immigrant girls perform better than boys coming from North Africa and Turkey. Whereas the large survey has depicted that Maghrebine girls are lagging behind Maghrebine boys or French girls, panel surveys have shown exactly the opposite.

The labour market

Source: Based on Meurs, Pailhé and Simon 2005.

Figure 8
*Odd ratios of unemployment among immigrants by countries of origin,
 France 1999*

It is indeed a huge paradox to see that these communities of workers who were imported into Europe just to alleviate the shortages of manpower, are now crippled by unacceptably high unemployment rates, which jeopardizes all the efforts towards integration, breakthroughs achieved in other spheres of life: birth and death, marriage, language acquisition, school and university enrolment.

With an active labour force predominantly constituted of workers and employees (from 77 to 82%), labour force from the Maghreb and Turkey remains highly masculine, sometimes more than in the country of origin. Low employment of females might be an effect of the high unemployment rate of the Maghrebines – females are perceived as competitors and refrain from offering their services in the labour market, except for manual or illegal jobs like housekeepers, prostitutes. This evidently exacerbates the traditional divide of gender roles in the Maghreb and Turkish immigrant society.

Unemployment rate remains unabatedly high and does not seem to adjust at all to economic cycles. In 1982, it was in the range of 15–22% depending on

the country of birth, 26–28% in 1990, 27–38% in 1995 and 33% in 1999 (for immigrants coming from Maghreb plus sub Saharan Africa plus Turkey). There is a negative correlation between the acquisition of citizenship among immigrants and the unemployment rate. Everything being equal, unemployment rate is halved for those immigrants who hold French citizenship. But the direction of causality is not obvious. Naturalized immigrants get a job more easily than others. But getting a steady job may encourage the immigrant to become a French citizen. This is sometimes almost compulsory for civil servants (with the exception of EU citizens).

The situation is even worse among the youngsters of the second generation. In 1990, unemployment rate was 40–50% for young Algerian males or female. In 1994, the global unemployment rate for foreigners non-EU was 53% among the 15–24 years, twice the French rate.

In terms of odd ratios, recent analysis of the 1999 survey on family history in France has shown that the likelihood for young North African to be unemployed is some three times higher than for the reference group (French and immigrants from Western Europe), much higher than for immigrants from Portugal. Immigrants from Turkey are in slightly better condition than North Africans, although less integrated in terms of demographic characteristics, schooling and language acquisition.

Besides, temporary jobs are more frequent among young immigrants from the Maghreb: 30–32% for employed males aged 20–29 years, than in the French population: 22%. Nowadays, as opposed to previous times long schooling is not any more a guarantee for a stable employment. University graduates of immigrant origin are unemployed twice more frequently: the rate 16% higher than in the French population of same educational level. Unemployment is also widespread among Moroccan immigrants in Belgium and in the Netherlands, about 30% in Belgium (end of the eighties) and 30–36% in the Netherlands. The same pattern by sex and age, with the youngsters even more out of the labour force, prevails.

Socio-professional categories at the top and the middle of the social ladder have increased in significance among the non-naturalised Maghrebines between 1982 and 1990. From 2.7 to 8.2% among Algerian immigrants, 2.5 to 7 among Moroccan immigrants and 5.4 to 9.2% among Tunisian ones. But new waves of skilled migrants might have contributed to this achievement.

Social mobility *per se* is limited and much lower among immigrants than in the native French population. Hence, the probability that the son of an agriculturalist or a worker moves upward on the socio professional ladder and becomes an independent civil servant or a highly skilled employee in the tertiary sector was only 18% only 1992 for immigrants (mainly from the Maghreb but also from Turkey, Spain and Portugal whose social mobility is higher). Among native French this proportion was three times higher: 41%. In Belgium, about

two-thirds of the sons of Moroccan immigrant workers share the same profession as their fathers.

At odds with the convergence that was noticed concerning many demographic features, the integration of the immigrants into the European labour markets is not really advanced. Furthermore, there are some signs that the situation is worsening. This is indeed the key to the exclusion of these immigrants in many other fields not presented here: income generation, indebtedness, transfers from the social security systems to the households, assets, residential and housing segregation, violence and delinquency, racism, xenophobia, counter-racism, anti-youth prejudice, overrepresentation in the prison population. It is remarkable to note how much the reciprocal vision between the majority population and those of North African immigrant background changes as soon as they are integrated into the labour market. A more harmonious type of relationships is then inaugurated. The idle and quarrelsome “sauvageons” (little savages) as qualified by a – leftist – candidate to the next French elections, soon become accepted as part of the national fabric by the majority population as soon as they find a decent job. But they are not so numerous to move in this direction. Many do it the other way round, as we can see it in the unemployment figures.

Ironically, Europe is considering “replacement migration” to replenish its dwindling labour force, namely from the Maghreb countries which would export about 10 millions emigrants to the EU in the period of 2000–2025, whereas there remain still huge pockets of unemployed originating from the same North African countries.

This undeniable economic and social exclusion of the immigrants from North African countries, might leave the impression that they are very much dissatisfied with living in Europe. Astonishingly, a recent survey on Moroccans abroad provides a less gloomy picture. The Moroccans abroad (54% living in France, 19% in Italy, 11% in Spain, 7% in Belgium and 5% in the Netherlands), consider that their migration projects have been more or less successful; only 7% consider that they have failed and 25% that they have only partially succeeded. Interestingly, the failure rate is highest among the youngest and the more recent emigrants. 50% of the respondents are extremely satisfied with their working conditions and 32% fairly satisfied. 71% have friends from the host country and 71–74% were not victims of an act of racism or xenophobia on their place of work or of living. The schooling of boys and girls is valued very positively in the host country and the only regret is the loss of the Arabic (written not spoken) language. Finally, 68% consider that they are more or less integrated, versus 31% who feel, more or less excluded.

This apparent contradiction between the objective socio-economic conditions of living of the non-EU migrants in Europe and their subjective perception of integration/exclusion (at least among Moroccan migrants and for those

who spent their summer holidays in their country of origin), points to the enormity of the research requirements to assess and monitor in a scientific way the questions pertaining to the immigrants from North Africa or from elsewhere in the developing world.

Needless to say, all the coming analysis should be specific by the different nationalities. Aggregating the different communities in one single group like “Moslem”, or “Arab” or even “North African” is misleading. The example of two of the largest so-called Moslem groups Moroccan immigrants and Turkish ones have clearly shown diverging patterns in some fundamental aspects of life and work. Besides, each country of origin has its own history, and a special history of interaction with the different parts of Europe. This is true for Morocco, Tunisia and even Turkey. This is even more true in the case of Algerian immigrants for whom it is virtually impossible to capture the problems raised by their integration in France without considering the historical context of colonization, then of war.

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