Biopolitics, regions and demography

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Introduction

Historical, social philosophical thinking about the spatial organization of population looks back to a long history. But in the 18th century very important intellectual techniques were developed and ideas of regions became key points in thinking about longer term demographic processes. These notions, ideals and set of ideas have been shaped by local political and demographic developments, the global orientation of various thinkers, global demographic changes and the overall progress of science and technology. Demography has never been a fully fledged science, but has been related to other social sciences. Nonetheless as we will see it has been rather systematic in working out concepts of regions and the variants which proved to be influential in historical and historical-political thinking.

The paper argues that concepts and ideas of demographic regions have been parts of evolving, many times conflicting discourses on how competing nations and their regions (their relevant social institutions) fit into a global fight over resources and related developmental opportunities within the context of global and local developmental and related social hierarchies. The paper claims that five major periods can be established in this history: from the early 18th century till the end of it, early 19th century till the First World War, the period between the World Wars, from the Second World War till the 1980s and the period afterwards. The paper also argues that till the last third of the 20th century the control fertility and nuptiality (marriage) were the main concerns while afterwards these concepts of regions have been deconstructed and have given way to heated debates over migration.

Morality and populationism in the 18th century

In Europe a systematic idea of demographic, historical demographic regions was born in the late 18th century more than a century after the birth of political arithmetics and

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1 Thanks to CAS, Sofia, thanks to CEU IAS, Dávid Rózsa, Levente Pakot, Péter Őrő, Thanks the
demography. The idea of comparative population development (concerning relevant social institutions and processes of marriage, family, fertility and mortality) and its relationship to other social institutions and arrangements appeared earlier, most importantly with regard to nations and local communities, but there was no idea of identifying various geographic spaces with specific demographic behavior.

Nevertheless a latent idea of region and population (the spatial spread of population) existed well before and an actually could be a major concern for various thinkers. Beyond some early thinkers like Ptolemei, most importantly we have to mention Ibn Khaldun, who in the 14th century reflected upon the spread and increase of human population and civilization constrained by mainly climatic and environmental factors in which he was followed by later geographers and very importantly Montesquieu. (Ibn Khaldun, 1987, 45-69) It is very important to note that Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century argued that the growth of population through cooperative mechanisms had a positive spill over effect and led to a development of the economy and through this power.

In his Persian Letters (Montesquieu 1964, no. 113-119) Montesquieu also had rather explicit ideas concerning regions and areas, as related to population development, environment and social institutions from the point of view of depopulation of which he was gravely concerned (Tomaselli 1988). This concern in the early 18th century was rather widespread and population growth was seen as a positive process. Montesquieu divided the world according to religions among which Christianity was not superior, at least in its effect on population development. Even history was understood by him in religious terms as the Roman Empire, the main historical reference point was also seen as being influenced mainly by religion. As opposed to later Eurocentric versions of historical development the Roman Empire was not linked to Europe only and Europe was not the most important and exclusive inheritor of the Roman heritage. Furthermore the Roman Empire was idealized by Montesquieu not early modern Europe or France. The world outside Europe was not objectified as the target of European activity. All countries were presented as somewhat equal. Very importantly he was critical of colonization as according to him it caused unwelcome depopulation as people were destroyed on the colonized territory itself or as slaves from Africa (Montesquieu 1964, Letter CXIX) and colonizers also lost people in large numbers.

Montesquieu was a harsh opponent of the lack of divorce in Christianity, especially among Catholics which was seen as an unfortunate and historically not so old social custom, which reduced fertility via forcing people to live together without proper emotional basis and it joined “living men to dead bodies”. He cynically noted that “After scarcely three years of marriage the partners neglect to do what is essential to it” (Montesquieu, 1964, Letter CXVI page 195). At the same time he also opposed
polygamy among the Muslims, which also reduced the capacity of men to reproduce (Montesquieu, 1964, Letter CXIV) Thus he saw both areas equally problematic especially as departing from the Roman experience of supporting monogamy and divorce. Protestants and Protestant countries were praised for allowing at least the marriage of priests and the clergy. According to Montesquieu they (Switzerland, Holland etc.) were more populous and more industrious.

Beyond religious norms and regulations some other factors also mattered for him in demographic behavior. The mode of production could also be a factor especially among the savages, where hunting and gathering did not allow any population growth. In addition to mode of production social customs and various even accidental factors could also influence population development. Very importantly from the point of view of later regionalization stem family inheritance (one son inherits key assets) was seen as reducing fertility and it was a production of “vanity”, while equal heritage among sons was supportive (Montesquieu, 1964, Letter XIX).

**Demographic regions and the idea of global control: Malthus**

Before Malthus appeared on the scene we have to mention a certain debate which had an impact on the way ideas of regions evolved. (Tomaselli 1988, Teitelbaum 2006) Mercantilists held a pronatalist view that there was a need to increase the power of the monarch via increasing the labor force and/or the number of soldiers. This was a competitive idea in the arena of states fighting for territories and resources, but it lacked a direct link to spatial spheres beyond nation states and their colonies. The Mercantilists or the related utopians (like Condorcet) did not have the pessimism that any increase of population would lead to obstacles in economic growth and the space of the polity. This optimism was shared by thinkers outside France like Süssmilch (Süssmilch 1983), who argued that as a form of wise and divine government monarchs should do everything for the sake of increasing the population of the relevant political community via easing the access to marriage, controlling food prices, not loosing unnecessarily people before “his time” or even via encouraging immigration and discouraging emigration.

The idea of increasing the demographic strength of the power of the sovereign using various methods of intervention, thus thinking in terms of compact territorial framework (like emerging nation states) plus the possibility of an ever increasing population was first questioned by the physiocrats when they shifted attention concerning factors of production from labor to land (Vilquin 2006, Teitelbaum 2006). Land as an economic factor was of course contained politically (borders) or by the climate and/or its natural conditions. It is worth noting that during the 18th century the available arable land increased due to warming up (Braudel, 46-51), but still it was seen as fixed as compared to labor and capital. As opposed to mercantilists physiocrats argued that only agriculture was a real source of value (not industry or commerce) and that
population should grow only till land can feed the relevant population and this balance is regulated via the standard of living. Later classical economists, most importantly David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus introduced the idea that out of the factors of production land was a problematic one as the marginal increase of capital or labor investment led to diminishing returns due to the fixed nature of land and the decline of the quality of additional inputs. This questioned that agricultural production could be increased infinitely and thus the increase of population might be a very serious problem as related to the quantity of food. Malthus ventured to solve the problem and actually this was how he constructed the idea of demographic regions which was part of a new way of conceptualizing international politics and moral control over human reproduction. This he did in the second edition of his Principles of Population in 1803 (Malthus 1826). The key point is that Malthus combines various elements which all existed before his time, but in his later pieces (second to sixth edition) on the principles of population he combined them into a very simplistic (one is tempted to say very restrictive as compared to people like Montesquieu) but powerful colonial-Eurocentric epistemic mix most probably due to his position at College of the East India Company: So he combined:

- that there is no real social cooperation between individuals beyond sexual relationships and instincts to reproduce
- the idea of differential demographic behavior according to local social classes and the required suppression of lower classes in order to avoid the unintended consequences (decline of wealth) concerning the whole society and most importantly the upper classes.
- the idea of differential demographic behavior according to regions of the world (possible linkages to the local class hierarchy)
- these regions and related states represented various levels of historical-moral progress according to the ratio of positive (war famines, epidemics) and negative (voluntary control of fertility through delaying marriage till resources can be accumulated for establishing families) “checks of population”
- and linked all these aspects via establishing a unilinear and comprehensive global-local moral scale of various controls over the population.

As opposed to Montesquieu Malthus not only opposed “overpopulation but he had a fixed hierarchical “reading of history sideways” as Arland Thornton has called this technique (Thornton, 2005, Böröcz 2003, Melegh 2002, 2005, 2006, 52-54) and established a specific system linking regions, historical development and demographic behavior via scaling the ratio of negative and positive checks. This technique and the constant recalibration of this progress-regional differences-history rod of measurement
has been the most important focus in demographic thinking during the last 200 years as reference point either positively or negatively as Thornton has demonstrated concerning theories of family life (Thornton 2005). Malthus envisaged and established one of the key ideas of global biopolitical control based on liberal economic thought, colonial gaze and the internalization of global/local social hierarchies and this has set an intellectual arena in which most of the debates over demographic changes and resources went on till the late 20th century (Melegh 2000, 2002, 2006).

The former Jesus College fellow, Anglican curator and would be East India Company educator Malthus had a very strange mental map based on accounts of colonial adventurers (“voyagers” as called by him) like captain Cook concerning the world outside Europe and his travels within Europe. There are various geographical divisions in the texts of Malthus.

There is a Europe versus non-Europe divide. Non-Europe and past Europe are refolded also into history: Book I Of the Checks to Population in the Less Civilized Parts of the World and in Past Times. Versus Book II Of the Checks To Population in the Different States of Modern Europe. The “bottom of the scale of human beings” is that of Tierra del Fuego described as living in a “miserable” state where there was no voluntary control over fertility (this territory was long seen as a bottom and even Comte used almost exactly the same words). Concerning the “barbarian” characteristics among Australian aborigines, American Indians Malthus mentions constant fight, promiscuous intercourse, low status of women, deformed children, filth and nastiness. Non-modern Europe and its progress scale is followed in a very strange zig-zag way on the map based on very impressionistic evidence.

Non-Europe is behind past Europe as represented by Greece and Rome. But the “ancient inhabitants of the North of Europe are between the inhabitants of “Islands of the South Sea” and among modern pastoral nations well behind Africa, China, India and Japan and of course Rome and Greece. This is partially due to a North South divide which he establishes historically (Barbarian North versus the Roman Empire) and which he constructs in terms of climate and mode of cultivation.

Modern Europe which is explicitly seen as homogenous in terms of habits “owing to the similarity of the circumstances in which they are placed”. Europe is united in the use of preventive checks as opposed to “past times” and “the more uncivilized parts of the world” This can be regarded as a line of racial-historical difference. (Malthus, 1826, Bk II, Ch.XIII in paragraph II.XIII.41)

Nonetheless Europe is not completely homogenous and Malthus, who traveled extensively in Europe, divides up Europe also in various and somewhat conflicting ways. He draws a dividing line between North (Norway, Sweden and Russia) as
opposed to other regions (as he calls Middle part, or England, France and Switzerland). The line is drawn not due to some major demographic characteristics (although the greater role of positive checks is raised in the case of Sweden and Russia), but to having a similar “internal economy”, while “the middle parts of Europe” differ very little from England. In later parts of the texts Norway is actually exempted from this region and it is linked to Switzerland, France and England where mortality and fertility is low (as a key theoretical element these processes were linked according to Malthus) and also there was a higher proportion of unmarried seen as the most morale solution to break out from high mortality and high fertility “traps”. Noteworthy institutionally Malthus claims that demographic differences are also due to the lack or the existence of secure private property, free government and free land market placing Malthus firmly into the line of liberal thought. These institutions can be seen as the contextualizing factors in addition to “habits” regulating fertility and marriage.

Malthus had large-scale impact and ever since there is a constant reference to him and his “pessimistic” view. His concrete ideas of regions have not been so popular and even we can say that they were rather unclearly formulated and that they were mainly forgotten. Only the idea of north-west Europe has proved to be persistent but with major modifications. But we will later see that his idea of age at marriage and the proportion of ever-married became a huge inspiration in the second half of the 20th century.

**Conservative moral reformism and the idea of three regions Europe: Frederic Le Play**

Malthus wrote little about inheritance and various other process of family formation or family economy, while they were among the concerns of many other thinkers. The person who made this a crucial element was the conservative moralist Le Play who writing about the workers of Europe (1855) and his later pieces (1872) of the organization of the family introduced a three type regional differentiation mainly based on inheritance, parental control, cohabitation and family budgets which differentiation was different for those of Malthus (Thornton 2005 etc.):

- Stem family (Central Europe including France), Middle: two peninsula of the Mediterranean (Italian and Spanish)
- unstable family (Northwestern Europe) West: The industrial areas of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and France.
- and patriarchal family (Eastern Europe, including Hungary) East: Between the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean, Scandinavia, Russia, Poland, Hungary and Turkey. Within Europe he had the idea of the “Slavic East”

Le Play is clear representative of the non-Malthusian French pronatalism going back to the 18th century as we could see even in the case of Montesquieu and followed by various other thinkers most notably Condorcet, (Teitelbaum-Caselli, Sen,) France was a
unique country in this respect. It was a major colonial power on the first level of the global hierarchy, but still due to the constant fight with the British Empire and other European powers, most importantly Germany (after the Franco-German war) it understood itself as being in constant struggle for her dominance in population discourses. Malthus thus was clearly seen as something irrelevant in the national-colonial imaginary of France. (Hall, 1973; Quine, 1996; Schneider, 1982, 1990) Even concerning countries beyond US, Britain and the Netherlands we can argue that Malthusianism was a rather marginal set of ideas until the late 19th century. Even in that period nonetheless it remained a highly contested idea and it was contextualized by the national-colonial competition over resources and influence including population size. Instead of colonial expansion Le Play was looking for domestic resources (Teitelbaum) and was interested in measuring the moral strength of the nation and his field work in various European countries aimed at measuring the strength and the stability of intertwined work and family organization. The classification of these social institutions were linked to regions and also social and moral development.

The key idea of Le Play was the difference between market based industrial class systems and various forms of integrated rural systems. This contrast appeared in his ideas of regions. This was not a clear geographical idea as industrial areas of Central Europe were also delegated into the Western type (even one family in Vienna). Nonetheless, he uses the idea of a line separating North Africa, the Middle East, South Italy (!) Hungary, Northern Europe and “Slavic” Europe for the rest of Europe and also he had a clear idea of North Western Europe as being separate from both the mixed areas (Middle) and that of the East. Both lines proved to be very powerful in later demographic thinking. He was the first person who formulated ideas of regional variation of family systems as opposed to Malthus who saw only minor internal European borders (some of them close to that of Le Play), but basically he argued for overall homogeneity concerning Europe. Le Play is also the first person who categorizes these regions by names like “East” (“Eastern group”) and “West” (“Western group”), thus having a more explicit conceptual regionalization.

Following the region-history-development scale he also sees advancement from the patriarchal systems to the modern unstable families as real development. But opposed to the developmental scale he has an opposing moral scale in which the stability of the patriarchal system is much praised. Thus Le Play is the first demographer, who opposed the idea of the West as being the most developed and occupying the most moral position (like in the case of Malthus) and sees social development combined with moral decline. He does not exclude the possibility of a moral solution in the most developed areas and actually he is arguing for finding such a solution via changing various social institutions (like partible inheritance in France) in order to unite moral and developmental focal points. This perspective also proved to be an important one in further debates in the 20th century even concerning regional differentiation, most notably the fascist and later with a different logic the state socialist challenge to Western domination. This also had an impact on ideas of regions in demographic development.

*Increased fight: regions versus demographic resources: demographic thinking between the two world wars*
Up till the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century the idea of direct intervention to population development was somewhat limited. There were ideas and programs which served “demographic interests”, like the pro migration committee in England (Emigration Committee, 1826-7 presided by Horton who asked for the support of Malthus)\textsuperscript{2} But overall the idea of a direct control over population and most importantly over fertility was not accepted. The strong support for Malthusianism came only with the advancement of eugenics, the spread of family planning methods and the overall biologization of demographic discourses which led to the open discussion of intervening into fertility control on the basis of social classes. In these cases morality as an external guidance over behavior lost momentum and more and more “moral” ideas were sublimated into (and to large extent emptied by) demographic and eugenic techniques of power. The state gained some strength and immediate political interest over demographic processes. It became to be seen as direct resource which needed direct resource management (and this became the new morality) in a highly competitive world, actually disrupted by large scale wars within Europe and in its colonies.

This was an era when mortality and fertility went through dramatic changes but in a differential way. The tempo, the timing varied rather substantially and this also pushed thinkers to reflect on the ways population could be managed and of course the idea of regional differences gained momentum. There were three main approaches in ideas of managing population development.

A liberal approach which utilized the idea of the West as being a focal point of development and also in progress of control over fertility. This is the Malthusian tradition, but by now the moral element (avoiding “pauperism” on an individual and collective level) is sublimated into techniques of fertility control itself. In varying ways this approach, which later was called as demographic transition or demographic revolution time to time made alliances with eugenics promoting “quality” reproduction and even later it could easily transform itself into a repressive idea globally aiming at direct interventions due to Malthusian crises. This approach was well represented by Thompson, Laundry and Notestein all having explicit ideas of regions.

Conservative or fascist approach questioned the idea that the West (or North and Western Europe) represented the focal point of global development. It either argued that the region was declining (permanently or cyclically) or it argued that the morality of this development is questionable. This approach focused on the rise of the “us” community as opposed to dominant powers. The “us” was defined in a fluid way as being a nation, ethnic group race or class. Very importantly this type of demographic resource management relied on a biological or culturally essential ethnic/national/racial characteristics. Morality was either sublimated into various repressive measures needed for the rise (the rise of the nation/race/class is possible only by various “morally” acceptable demographic behavior) or it was embedded into ethnic/national/racial types directly (i.e the “real essence” of the concerned group was “revealed”), and the rise of the concerned group legitimized almost everything against other groups or internal

enemies understood also in terms of demographic behavior ("racial hygiene"). Ideas of regions also appeared among these thinkers, and as we will see that nonetheless there was some kind of a consensus between thinkers of this later approach and thinkers of the liberal approach. This approach was well represented among others by Corrado Gini, the famous Italian statistician, the founder of the journal called Genus, in Hungary by Pál Teleki, an influential geographer, eugenicist politician. Both of these approaches were challenged by so called "populist" or "narodnik" thinkers in Eastern Europe (Ferenc Erdei, Dimitri Gusti, Henri Stahl, Imre Kovách), which shared the idea of a possible rise of otherwise declining national-racial-ethnic-social groups with essentialized characteristics. This made fascist/conservatives and narodnik/populists often allies of each other. But very importantly the narodnik/populists focused on changing the social background of population processes instead of promoting ideas of demographic determinism or large scale immediate intervention. In other words the populist and conservative/fascist approaches operated in a globally competitive sphere and worked on the advancement of the concerned nation, ethnic group. But while the first saw the advancement in the concerned and targeted behavior of the peasants itself (i.e. fertility), the other saw the pronatalist or social intervention only as means to discipline and to achieve directly a higher relative position of the “nation” and/or “race” against “others” inside and outside (see for instance the text of prime minister Filov from 1941, Baloutzova 2011, Melegh 2012). Populists also had rather clear ideas of the “West” and its various counterconcepts, but beyond demographic morality sublimated into nationhood, they also had a drive for social morality and social conditioning (the landlessness of peasants lead to unfortunate demographic behavior) as opposed to the second, fascist, conservative approach which primarily just wanted to control the populations through repression, eugenic/biological selection and coercion.

Global control and demographic transition: regional politics

In the 1920s, 30s and finally the mid 1940s there was a widespread shock over the fertility decline combined with other demographic processes in North America and Europe which forecasted the relative decline of population ratios of the “West”. This ratio just went up in the 19th century and because of a fear that control over lands and resources could also be restructured (peacefully or by war) due to population development there was an increased need to understand these processes and to work out new methods of population management. This combined sense of a demographic awareness led to the idea of demographic transition in which three authors gained widespread reputation Edward Thompson (1929), Adolphe Landry (1934), Frank W. Notestein (1945). The theory of demographic transition is not only the most influential idea of global demographic change (after that of Malthus), but also an explicit regional understanding of demographic change. Just like in the case of Malthus there is an acute sense of not only of regional differences but that of classes. This theory recombined the class, history, progress and region scale and has established one of the main interpretative frameworks. In a somewhat hidden, but many times direct way this framework was utilized and challenged by the other two approaches mentioned above. (Melegh 2006, 2009)
All three authors shared the idea that fertility and mortality was both declining but fertility decreased quicker along various regions according to class and regions. The local class difference was sometimes also an indirect way of raising the issue of differential fertility along racial lines.

It is also important to note that this was the period when debates over various regionally located family types started in ethnography, sociology and legal science. These family types (in some ways following Le Play) were understood as a relevant factors in understanding political orientations and among them the key ones were mainly complex peasant families and family systems like the South Slav “zadruga”, the Russian “mir” (and obschina) or for instance the “nagycsalád” (Todorova 2006, 151-162, Faragó 1977). It is important to note that the ideological and social implications of these were discussed with various somewhat conflicting interpretative frameworks as described above.

**The idea of demographic transition and Edward Thompson**

In the American Journal of Sociology Thompson use a threefold system of “group A” including Northern and Western Europe North America and also Australia versus “group B” including South and Eastern Europe without Russia and “group C” including everybody else. Very importantly the dividing line between group A and B was the “Danzig-Trieste” line which was close to the line between Mixed and Eastern areas according to Le Play (with important differences that not the North West ended here and the mixed area included Italy and Spain.). This line also satisfied a rather clear acuteness of an East-West division and later the Trieste point started its career named after John Hajnal. The work of Thompson was a rather descriptive and he mainly assessed the dynamics of expansion and its implications for land, but very clearly he had an idea of modernization and especially modern industry and sanitation as being key factors in global demographic change.

It is important to note that the regional idea of Thompson proved to be one of the dominant ideas as putting together Eastern and Southern Europe appeared often. As we analyze below Corrado Gini had somewhat similar ideas, but it also appeared in the works of Wilbert Elis Moore on economic demography (Moore 1945). Even more we can argue that in some ways John Hajnal in his 1983 article presented somewhat similar ideas and Peter Laslett also when he developed five models in his 1983 article.

**Demographic revolution and Adolphe Landry**

Landry was different from Thompson in the sense that he had much clearer ideas of a “demographic revolution” and demographic differentials among classes while his ideas of regions were more or less hidden in the text. He divided up whole historical process into three stages with a background of a long tradition of pronatalism and a fear of population decline and this approach was far less triumphant like that of Thompson and later Notestein. According to him the first stage had automatic equilibrium, in the second stage equilibrium was achieved through various human strategies (e.g. marriage patterns to maintain standard of living) while in the last stage this control is lost and there is no equilibrium and thus population decline does not stop and there is moral decay. (Vilquin 2006, Landry 1934, 87)
In terms of regions he is much less explicit, although he shares that in this revolution various stages were performed by various areas in different time periods and let say between Italy and Romania there was a serious time lag in the decline of fertility. But he does not develop regional ideas as such and he mainly remains in the footsteps of Montesquieu in his interest in history in general understood in a Eurocentric manner.

**Demographic resources of power and Frank Notestein**

Before looking at person who had been developing another perspective on demographic development and management even in the 1910s and 1920s (most notably Gini, Conze and the East European narodniki) we need to look Notestein and his ideas of demographic development and regions. The novelty of Notestein lies not only in the revision of the Thompson scheme but also in his ability to push these ideas to the level of international politics. This was due partly to the fact the United States could take over a leading position from the previous colonial European states in global politics, and partly to the appearance of international organizations like that of the FAO, which started the construction of policies for the global management of population and food production. The idea of demographic transition and of inherent regional differentiation was a key in this formulation of global politics.

The fully fledged theory successfully combined various elements, which have been circulating in demographic thinking before. It had a strong neo-Malthusian flavor in idealizing conscious family planning among the middle classes in the West. At the same time it explicitly broke with the Malthusian framework and opted for the social determinism (i.e. population trends are not independent variables and they are influenced by various social institutions, industrialism, urbanization and individualism) as suggested by many thinkers from the 18th century including Montesquieu, Condorcet or Marx, but it is to be noted that this turn was only upheld in the case of the Western population and later, after the Communist takeover in China in 1949 it was reversed for the Third World as there allegedly there was no time to wait till social forces do their job (Sen, Melegh, Szreter). In this Malthusian turn regionalization of global demographic processes played a very important role. This regionalization was “naturally” put into a progress-region scale, but very importantly it also directly maintained an idea of competition over resources. Here is quote from Notestein concerning the demographic resource of power which clearly links this approach also to that of fascist-conservative thinkers to be analyzed later:

*Let's put that all together, if we can, in terms of power, resources and problems. Western Europe: huge, high skilled, at the end of its growth period but plenty powerful in the trading world, politically organized, no fundamental difficulties here. .. The United States: roughly the same thing with an awfully favorable balance of people and resources, one, if it solves its political and economic problems which are not very fundamental ones, that adds up to a very effective power in the world… Asia is quite a different thing. We hear a lot of nonsense talked about population growth there as though it means power. It is a source of disturbance. (Notestein, F. W. (1949): Demographic sources of power. Lecture: 20 September, Manuscript (Office of Population Research, Library, Princeton p. Notestein 1949, 22-23)*
The global map of Notestein relied on the West centric map of Thompson. But it contained new elements. The linkage between Western Europe, North America and Australia, New Zealand was maintained, but within Europe this first zone (“incipient decline” of population growth was extended to much of Central Europe and Southern Europe, while these countries (Italy, Spain) were in region B in scheme of Thompson. Notestein maintained the Trieste-Danzig/Gdansk line, but the region beyond called Eastern Europe (region of “transitional growth”) was extended to the Soviet Union and Japan and thus the Third World (region of “high growth potential”) was somewhat reduced even concerning some countries in Latin America, Turkey, Palestine and parts of North Africa. It is worth noting that actually Thompson was also playing with the thought that industrialism in Russia and Japan would get these two countries out of category “C”, but the territorial extension of the second group by Notestein was far more radical. This also shows that Notestein avoided the inherent racial element maintained by Malthus and various other thinkers. Altogether the theory of demographic transition became successful in predicting further fertility decline (without prediction of instability like in the case of Landry) and successfully established a modernization theory with all its internal contradictions and potentials. This could be a cornerstone in the development of demographic thinking and very importantly regionalism as from this point on there was no question for a longer period that there were various regions and that they were to be understood if analysis and global management was the question.

*Regional and national metabolism: Corrado Gini*

Ideas of demographic transition understood as methods and interpretations of global demographic change did not remain unchallenged and it had a clear impact on regional thinking as well. The challenge came from all those areas which were seen in the transition theory as not being in the forefront of demographic progress toward lower fertility and mortality namely in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe (and from outside Europe see Melegh 2009) where demographic nationalism and also fascism was looking for ways to compensate geopolitical, territorial losses or to regain “strength” as a part of the global fight for resources. Italian and German fascism/Nazism are prime examples along East European conservative or narodnik type demographic nationalism (Gregor, 2005, Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001, Ipsen 1993, Wanrooij 2002). The key element was the fight against plutocratic Western nations in order to establish, restrengthen various “imperiums” in various spaces, many times understood as class wars on behalf of impoverished or even “proletarian” nations for the sake of the redistribution of territory and resources. This perspective could be based on ideas of radical social change (narodnik type) and on conservative and repressive methods (fascist).

The fascist approach can be very well exemplified by people like Corrado Gini, who are mainly forgotten, despite of the fact that they were rather influential thinkers of their time. Gini was a widely read and cited scholar who was well integrated into various demographic and statistical networks. He was also and influential political figure (head of the Central Institute of Statistics of Italy between 1926-1932), who for a while was also a key advisor of Mussolini in demographic issues, even in the famous Ascension
Day Speech of 1927, May. ("Number means force", Ipsen 1993). He was also the person who combined the issue of demographic rise to issues of redistribution rather early in the 1910s. Two titles of Gini show this approach clearly: *The Demographic Factors in the Evolution of Nations, 1911* and *The Amount and Composition of Wealth of the Nations, 1914*, which deal with

Although also representing the same biopolitical fear Gini was a firm critique of Malthus in several ways. First of all he (following Spengler and some other ways Pareto) believed in cycles of population development and his originality lies in the fact he combined regional demographic development with national and class demographic differentials. But his interpretation of these differentials were not based on differences in social and institutional background as understood by previous thinkers, but he followed and worked hard on a biological eugenic interpretation of population change. This theory was called by him demographic metabolism according to which upper classes loose their biological potential and they are replaced or supplied by population coming from the lower classes, whose potentials are higher.

The key thing in the theory of Gini is that he had an idea of internal class dynamics in fertility. The upper class in the first phase of the cycle of the nation (race) is fertile and with the development its fertility declines. At the same time there is a process called demographic metabolism in which there is a supply of people due to the higher fertility of lower groups, who are absorbed. In the longer run they also decrease their fertility. But this is just the local story which Gini puts into a regional-global story also. "Dying nations", i.e. the richer ones receive “fresh blood” from other, poorer nations. This terrain of population exchange can be within one race, most importantly the “white race” in which “Western and Northern Europe” (together with North America, Australia and New Zealand) represents the “upper class”. And Eastern and Southern Europe represent the lower class, which still had high growth rates to be maintained and even strengthened according to Gini.

It is very important to note that Gini in various ways was playing with the boundaries of race, nation, class and region in his text, which concepts were used almost completely interchangeable. His regional ideas can also be found in the text and his regional divisions followed the line which later became called the Hajnal line. His region of Eastern and Southern Europe contained Spain, Italy, the Balkans, Russia, Poland but excluded the Baltic countries, Austria and very interestingly Hungary due to the fact of a quick fertility decline. On the other hand and opposed to Hajnal later and following in some ways Thompson Gini was drawing also an explicitly racially understood line between Europe and non-Europe. The white race is standing above all the others, “the Hindu, the Malayan and the yellow races.”

It is important to note that combining social, national and regional “metabolisms” Gini’s theory was also a theory of migration and even a theory of the assimilation of migration. Gini heavily argues that too quick and too intense migrations leads to cultural conflicts and the tempo of assimilation should be slow. In this sense he foresaw many of the later debates on migration well before demography paid attention to it when writing about global demographic change.

Overall ideas of Gini contained original elements, but most of its elements fitted rather well into a wider anti-Malthusian discourse on eugenic and population concerns as related to the fate of nations/regions/races. His selective ideas and even regional
concepts (a relatively declining Northwest and Central Europe (including Hungary) as opposed to a more fertile South-Eastern Europe and other regions of the world) were ideas which resonated among others by the geographer Pál Teleki or the statistician Alajos Kovács, who all maintained that in the overall European and very importantly global fight there was a need to observe and to intervene directly into the development of social groups/ nations/regions from a racial hygiene point of view meaning how they can “properly” “amalgate” populations and spaces (Teleki 2000, 20, 31, 273-86, Ablonczy 2005, 26-33; Fülep et al, 2012). Teleki himself had ideas of regions (Danube region for instance), demography was not an important element in his regionalism. He had ideas of quickly growing Balkan states, but overall he maintained a national or Carpathian Basin perspective when he spoke about demographic issues and eugenic intervention. In this respect we can safely argue that as opposed to Western and even Italian fascist thinkers, East European conservative or populist thinkers had little vision beyond local versus overall “European” territories mainly because of lacking colonial ties and ideas of geopolitical positions requiring more nuanced perspectives then just “nations”.

It is also important to note that like in the Italian fascist discourses (see also in this respect Alfredo Rocco) and in Gini’s “theories” of metabolism the idea of migration also became important, not only because of immigration, but even because of outmigration and/or return migration. This once again resonated in countries like Hungary. In the global competition among nations for instance according to a speech of Teleki in 1917 these processes also required a eugenic selection. So not only the rather old idea of sending the paupers occurred like in the program of Holton asking for the support of Malthus, but also the filtering of return migrants which was rather unprecedented from the point of view of nationalist or even fascists concerns of loosing too many people due to emigration. (Compare the talk of Rocco as one of Mussolini’s key intellectual to Teleki 2000, 45, on Teleki and the overall development of eugenics in the region see also Turda, 2007, 2010, 2013.)

Conze and the Slavic East

With regard to the development of regional thinking Werner Conze was also important, following in some ways Le Play he was among the historians who established

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3 See the speech of nationalist Alfredo Rocco in 1923, who later became minister of justice: “Expansion is for us a necessity. Our land is limited and relatively poor while we have a scarcity of capital and an exuberant population. ... Spontaneously, instinctively, the nation found a solution ... it resolved the problem of expansion by means of emigration.... Too many in Italy view with pleasure and approval this solution ... The phenomenon of emigration today is grave. ... The fertility of the Italian population is considerable, but cannot long resist a bleeding of this sort. Remember: our true and greatest wealth is population, because in numbers is the greatest strength of all races. The most numerous peoples are not simply those militarily most important ... but economically every man has a value and represents capital. To lose millions of Italians means to lose billions of lire. Up until now our high fertility has allowed us to endure this open wound in the side of the nation. It has even allowed us to enjoy population increase in spite of emigration. ... And even though the birth rate remains high, the tendency in Italy is one of decline.” (Boll. CGE, iii (1923): 821-22) (cited in Ipsen 1993, 79.o.)
a research approach of linking family and household formation with inheritance patterns and in this sense he was a forerunner of some later approaches. (Szoltysek-Goldsten, 2009) Also he was creating the pathways toward the so called Hajnal line at least in the Baltic region. Conze was a follower and promoter of the “Eastern Studies” in Nazi Germany (a research area being the explicit promoter of “imperial” claims over space and population) and he published his related thesis in 1940. On the basis of the so called hufenverfassung system he claimed that there was a huge difference between the “Slavic” multiple household systems (grossfamilien) based on partible inheritance and the non-Slavic (e.g. Lithuanian) population which followed the hide system based on nuclear households and impartible inheritance in the 17th and 18th century. According to Conze the line was along the Southern fringes of Samogitia and Grodno, which line later was used for debates about the Hajnal line.

Narodnik and populist thinkers: debates in Eastern Europe

Some of the East European populist thinkers used ideas of regions and many times they also applied them for understanding longer term developments. They were prominent in discussing various complex and changing family forms and family systems like the zadruga or mir.

Among them there was an implicit logic in which not the demographic behavior but the regional development (“organic” West versus “distorted” East) was a key factor. In Hungary these regional ideas were used in interpreting demographic changes including sharp fertility decline as East European distortions as opposed to the organic development of the West, where fertility decline was seen as more normal, structurally less “crystallized process (Erdei, 1976, Melegh 2006, 76-82). The so called “sociographers” focused on crude birth-control and the “one child system. The “lack of vitality” was understood as a sign of social crisis and the “self-destructive” behavior of these groups morally was seen as collective “suicide” or “silent revolution” because of the repression of the “aristocratic,” “lordly” Hungarian agrarian system (Kovács 1989)

Very importantly just like the fascist/conservative thinkers they were also sublimating moral principles into national development understood as being threatened by the competitive systems and that of external colonization by the West and by internal colonization by the Jewish and the German minorities (In this they just followed fascist/conservative discourses as represented by people like Alajos Kovács, the head of the Hungarian Statistical Office).

In other countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Russia not fertility was the key issue but mortality. The key concern was mortality and the overall well-being, most importantly infant mortality and the hygienic conditions in the rural population (Kiss 2010, 121-123, Baloutzova 2011, 32-36 Ransel 1981, 143). The Gusti group in Romania and also the BANU party and the related activists in Bulgaria focused on village communities and rural land structures, but paid little attention to fertility and they mainly observed a huge discrepancy between Western and Central Europe and their own countries. The East/West dichotomy was a rather strong comparative framework among demographers and statisticians already in the early Soviet period in the 1920s (Porter 1993, 151-53).

Among the Russian agricultural economists, the so called organization and production school (e.g. Maslov, Chayanov, Kosinskii, Brutskus, Chelitsev) and the various narodnik
thinkers the above concerns were shared (they agreed that mortality in Russia became relatively much worse as compared to period of Malthus), but beyond unexplored references to “Europe”, “Western Europe” they mainly thought in terms of “national economy” and subregions of the national economy (see among others the description of Kerblay on the life, career and works of Chayanov 2006, xxv-lxxv). It is important to note that this school via establishing a link between demographic family cycles and the behavior of peasant economies not only transferred the macro and micro level assumptions of Malthus, but also provided a model for later debates on the regional and temporal differences of non, or semi-capitalist economies (see later for instance Alan Macfarlane 1978). They had an elaborated ideas of various economic systems, among which capitalism was just only one. It is also worth noting that when internal regional differences of Russian territories were concerned they drew such (North-South) internal lines in terms of variations of peasant economies which did not fit the later lines of Conze, Thompson, Hajnal or Laslett concerning the north western parts of Russia. (see below).

Debates after the Second World War: Political and demographic borders

Capitalism versus communism

After the second world war the intensive and open discussion of regions and demographic processes in the context of fight over resources somewhat declined but certainly did not disappear. It withdrew into more scholarly debates and they were less directly political and mainly through the issues of identity they established links to geopolitical changes. Nevertheless, with some notable exceptions they maintained a rather clear Eurocentric apology of the West and more importantly of the “unique” origins of Western capitalism. Previous regional classifications of regional historical demographic profiles were replaced by an instant debate over the global spread of state socialism. From the point of view of demographic transition theory as formulated by Notestein the key question was whether communism was related to demographic processes (Szreter, Melegh, 2006, Demény). Notestein gave a positive answer and as seen above there was a serious concern that the dramatic increase of population growth rates in Asia or Africa could lead to political change and a further reallocation of control over resources. The main issue was the victory of Chinese communists over forces of the Koumintag which meant the “loss” of additional hundreds of millions of people to communism fighting capitalism. This event led to the reformulation of modernization theory outside Europe when with the words of Notestein: “I think one can only come to the conclusion that …[fertility decline] will not come about. [in the case of China and India because of the size of the population] by the normal automatic processes of urbanization, industrialization, education (Notestein 1949, cited in Melegh 2006) and actually there was a need to intervene in order to avoid further political radicalization.

The debate over modernization and regions also appeared within Europe, when the emergence of socialism appeared in debates over population development and most importantly over Malthusianism. A clear East/West divide was set up along the block
lines, which come to surface even in very recent discussions on the so called second demographic transition as explained below.

In East European demography the idea appeared that Malthusianism was only applicable in capitalist countries while it did not apply in socialist countries where the reallocation of resources and the appearance of large scale demand for labor made fertility control unnecessary. (Melegh 2006, Petersen 1988, 90-95). Nonetheless, it is important to note that modernization theory was questioned in East European pronatalist demographic thinking, but it was claimed that East European progress toward modernity was quicker and more morale. The state socialist state also tried to integrate morality into its political techniques in order ensure a better position in geodemographic fights (i.e the propaganda argued that socialist countries performed worse for instance in terms infant mortality, but they were superior in terms of gender relations, Melegh 2006). On the one hand it included liberation of marriage, childbearing and family life from some social constraints and the suppression of “improper” demographic behavior on the other hand.

The Hajnal line and the deconstruction of biopolitical regions based on differential fertility and nuptiality.

Beyond the appearance of clear cut political border along the Trieste-Danzig line the debate over historical regions somewhat declined till the 1950s. The issue came back only in the 1960s when Hajnal formulated ideas of “European marriage patterns in perspective”. Hajnal was a statistician with Hungarian origin, who fled Nazi Germany in 1936 due to its anti-Semitic repression. Hajnal as an Oxford educated person had a career which took him to the United Nations and Princeton where the idea of demographic transition was most thoroughly researched and later got LSE with economic history credentials.

In his original article (1965) Hajnal successfully combined various elements. Most importantly he openly followed Malthus when he focused on the age at first marriage, and the proportion of ever-married and the regional, historical regional distributions of these variables. He also openly followed his ideas concerning Europe versus non-Europe representing not only difference but also the past) in Hajnal’s understanding pre-seventeenth century “Europe’. But he also revised him. In 1965 as compared to Malthus he reduced the territory of “Europe” to the region beyond the Trieste and St. Petersburg line toward the West. In 1983 when he further elaborated his ideas with other elements of household formation (the existence of neolocality, life-cycle servants, various rules of household fission etc.) he further reduced “Europe” to “Northwest Europe” as opposed to “ joint household formation systems” of all areas other than Northwest-Europe in the 1950s and 1970s. Thus basically he followed the line between the region “Western unstable” and “Mixed stem” family region as proposed by Le Play, or the line between region A and B as proposed by Thompson and cleared all other regional lines in the world in a dichotomy with Northwest Europe. It seems that beyond the dramatic regional reductions Hajnal was also able to push back the timing modernization (great transformation) of the late 19th century back to the early 17th and the 16th century. In this he was supported by a growing evidence of various analyses of local parish registers and various enumerations including tax records and also his
technique of reading history sideways, that is to say via his assumption that pre 17th century Northwest Europe was like Nepal in the 1970s. This push of great transformation back in history later started a huge debate among family historians and other social scientists interested in historical sociology or historical anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s. Foremost there was Peter Laslett, a friend and a long time collaborator of Hajnal, who became a harsh opponent of the modernization hypothesis in family history and who, mastering a large number of empirical material collected from North America, through Hungary or Mishino, Russia till Japan argued in various pieces, that the great transformation for complex patriarchal families to modern “unstable” nuclear family households was problematic and there were rather persistent historical regions at least from the 18th century. He was foremost interested in comparing the English historical experience with everybody else (The world we have lost), but he was an empiricall minded critical historian who designed with Hammel a typology of household types which are still in use throughout the world (Laslett 1972). His original attack was on the universal story of the advancement of individualism throughout the world from agrarian to industrial systems as taught in mainstream sociology at that time, but later he started a huge project on mapping the whole world on the basis of his typology (Laslett 1972). In 1983 in the edited volume of Richard Wall (Wall 1983) he proposed a typology of four historical regions based not only on household formation but also of organizing work on a micro level:

- West
- West/central or middle
- Mediterranean
- East

This typology was a break with that of Hajnal and many other demographic approaches in and basically provided a more detailed and sociologically more complex classification. Laslett never ventured for drawing exact lines, he stuck to existing empirical material he and his Cambridge Group had. So he had areas like Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, the village Grossenemer, Great Russian serf villages, Baltic provinces, but he was not looking for clear borders and even he methodologically was looking for “tendencies” or in other words statistical probabilities only. Even more he did not fix the historical period also and just talked about “traditional Europe” without a proper discussion of historical development. In this sense he did not give the idea of great transformation he just challenged its assumptions on family history.

Laslett in this work was supported by a large number of sociologists and historians throughout the world. He received widespread criticism also especially with regard to his first attempts (Lutz Berkner, Löfgren), but he also managed the set up the Cambridge Group for History of Population and Social Structure and a relatively large international and interdisciplinary network. Among his collaborators we find historians like Peter Czap, Richard Smith, Andrej Plakans, economic historians like Anthony Wrigley, Richard Schoefield, but also anthropologists and sociologists like Michael Anderson or the Hungarian sociologist Rudolf Andorka.

Andorka was very important as he started to focus on a territory actually lying on the Hajnal line. As a reformulation of the Hajnal idea he introduced a mixed type, namely the system of complex households with fertility control which appeared early historically. With this he managed to introduce some of the research problems (single child system,
fertility control etc) of Hungarian populists into empirically minded international historical research. With this approach he also formulated several research issues which became important during the deconstruction of the Hajnal line (Andorka 1975, 1983, 1986, 1995). In this he collaborated with the historian Tamás Faragó, who, as we will see later, became important in reinterpreting and reformulating the Hajnal line (Faragó 1977, 1985, 2001) It is worth mentioning that although no direct references were made the above attempts on finding an in-between model or mixed territory fitted very well the rise of the concept of Central Europe as represented by István Bíbó, Jenő Szűcs or Péter Hanák.

The questioning modernization theory as put forward by Laslett was also elaborated by Alan Macfarlane (previously working as an anthropologist on Nepal) writing about “The Origins of English Individualism” and by Richard M Smith who started a well focused work on medieval sources from the point of view of family structures and inheritance (Macfarlane, 1978,1986,1987, Smith R.M: 1984). Both of them came up with the idea that the Hajnal hypothesis was misleading in its historical assumptions of a great transformation and there was no substantial change at least in England as suggested by Hajnal and all other classical thinkers including Karl Marx, Max Weber and Karl Polányi. In this way they gave an interesting new momentum toward the Eurocentric interpretation of the birth of capitalism via destroying some of the early historical sociological claims (industrial and scientific revolution, urbanization etc) and put focus on the somewhat essentialized, continuous individualism and regulative role of private property concerning demographic processes at least in England.

The work of Macfarlane published in the late 1970s was also interesting not only because of his criticisms of the Hajnal’s idea of historical change, but also because he “reconstructed” the idea of East European peasantry out of the work major thinkers (including Karl Marx, Max Weber, Alexandr Chayanov and ex-east European scholars like Thomas and Znaniecki) and he showed that this model “hypnotized” English historians like Homans (Macfarlane 1978, 34-80). Nonetheless, it is to be mentioned that he did not refute the idea of Eastern Europe as a peasant society comparable to other regions outside Europe with a special demographic regime due to its social arrangements, most importantly household economies. He used an idea of Eastern Europe from the perspective of “peasant studies” of the 1970s. In this way he maintained an indirect alliance with John Hajnal and his dichotomic and Eurocentric view of social change.

Pushing back the Hajnal line was also promoted by the prominent Austrian historians Michael Mitterauer and Karl Kaser (Mitterauer-Sieder 1982, Mitterauer 2010, Szoltysék 2009) Mitterauer systematically recontextualized the “European family pattern” into hide system, so called hufenverfassung system which was already used by Conze ((Mitterauer 28-57). But instead of locating this division into the Baltics like Conze, Mitterauer generalized it for most of Western and Central Europe, along the lines of Carolingian Empire lines and pushed it back at least to the 9thcentury. He argued that this system led to all the features of the modern European family as understood by Laslett (small age difference between spouses, retirement of the elderly, late age at marriage, life-cycle service) (Mitterauer 2010, 60-69). In doing so he hoped to explain the uniqueness of the European historical development, thus this was also an attempt to
reformulate the Hajnal hypothesis in order to explain long term developments in a Eurocentric manner.

As another attempt to deconstruct the modernizationist understanding of family development related to ideas of historical regions the historical anthropologist Jack Goody not only questioned that modern family was created at the dawn of industrial modernity or just in North-Western Europe, but actually argued that pre-capitalist family systems have been more or less the same throughout Eurasia as opposed to Sub-Saharan African systems, where women played a very important role in the transfer of inheritance among generations. (Goody 1983, 1996, 1996a) Reviving the concept of Eurasia he wrote like this: “Despite the changes that Christianity and Islam brought about there are significant continuities in some of these practices not only across Eurasia but also between the ancient and modern world. Indeed religious practices and beliefs are in an interesting way part of that broad continuity. (Goody 1990, 465). Goody clearly pointed out that any argument concerning the uniqueness of “European” development is questionable. Elementary nuclear families, the dominance of kindreds, late age at marriage, parental love, conjugal love, the presence of living-in-servants existed throughout Eurasia and were not “invented” in Europe. (Goody 1990, 486; 2000, 106) Even more Goody rejected that the basics of capitalism and protoindustrialism was in anyway unique to Europe and thus he questioned the still dominant “European miracle” thesis so much cherished since the European thinkers started interpreting global history in the 18th century (about the debate see Melegh 2012).

But the concept of Eurasia did not prevent Goody from seeing differences within Europe (Goody, 2000 100-118). Goody followed those historians who could see some real difference between North and South, instead of the East/West division promoted by Hajnal and further developed by Laslett. Goody stressed the North-South difference concerning pre 18th century Europe in terms of age at marriage. In the North it was higher. Europe was also divided by inheritance structured by Roman versus customary law, which difference cut France into two parts. This way Goody followed Le Play very clearly even via referring to the changes during the French Revolution and using the term stem family. While making these claims Goody nonetheless maintained that these and any kind of differences could not be generalized and internal temporal and spatial differences were empirically too big for creating clear types and even more importantly he separated “European” capitalism and family behavior.

As mentioned above behind the above debates there were also implicit attempts to understand the development of political systems, like liberal systems and communist systems from the microstructural point of the family history. This element was made explicit by Emmanuel Todd, the firm Laslett supporter, but also a follower of Le Play, a French demographer and historian (Todd 1983) who drew a global and within also a European map of various “anthropological” family systems which according to him could explain ideologies (liberal inegalitarian, liberal egalitarian, authoritarian inegalitarian, authoritarian egalitarian):

- Exogamous community family
- Authoritarian family
- Egalitarian nuclear family
- Absolute nuclear family.
This led him to draw a rather complex map of Europe with England as an extreme Hungary, the Balkans, the USSR as an other opposing system, while rest of continental Europe was different. The southern part of South Europe was also separated from the other parts. The nuclear family was typical in England, the Netherlands, Denmark and Northwestern France; The authoritarian family was dominant in Germany and the adjacent countries of Central Europe -Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Belgium; in most of Scandinavia; in parts of France and Spain; in Ireland and in Scotland. The egalitarian-nuclear family was typical in France, most of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Romania, and Greece. Finally, the community family characterized Russia, Finland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, small patches of Italy and Southern France (See also Todorova 2006, 161)

While Goody went beyond the European areas and that was the way how he distanced himself from the Hajnal line and related ideas of historical regions, there were some other historians mainly from Central and South Eastern Europe, who either reformulated or even deconstructed regional ideas from a social and economic point of view via drawing attention to a complex interplay of various social and economic institutions (inheritance, neolocality, geographic factors, the role of the state and of landlords etc.) (Todorova) There was a refusion of general models and patterns like the Balkans and its zadruga system (Maria Todorova, Tamás Faragó) or talked about mosaic patterns, namely patterns constrained by local economic, ethnic and cultural factors (Őri, Faragó), These attempts were pushed to their logical end via putting population processes into micro frameworks like Benda, Pakot, etc.

Maria Todorova has always been keen on and analyzing and deconstructing discursive “myths” like Balkanism or Central Europe (Todorova 1996) and in this constant demystification she tried to reinterpret such regionally specified family systems like the zadruga (Todorova 2006). In her criticism targeted at regionalist historical demography from Le Play, through MacFarlane, Todd to Hajnal and Laslett she came to the conclusion if zadruga is to be maintained at all as an important social institution then even within the region it should be linked only to specific areas and social groups, with several variations due to the interplay of various social, cultural and very importantly political factors. (Todorova 2006, 154-174)

Faragó was even clearer in refuting general models. In his works he found not only various types even within smaller regions (Faragó 1977, 1985) as variant as complex zadruga versus nuclear stem families, but citing Kraeger also maintained that preindustrial household structures were so complex and so much dependent on various demographic, social and ethno-cultural factors that models had to be severely confined spatially and temporally (Faragó 2001) Őri went even further as argued that only mosaic patterns could be identified in the 18th century Hungary, in its central regions.

From the 1990s several historians have argued that regional models were useless or at least as opposed to macro levels on a micro level historical processes and relationships did not match overall patterns. As they argued even similar demographic behavior could have different causes (social, versus religious versus ethnic versus inheritance differentiations) or they had a logic very different from macro developments (Őri 2003, Benda 2001, 2002, 2008; Melegh 2001, 83; Pakot, 2012). Overall we can say that even in historical demography micro history turned away from sub European regional models
and differentiations in their focus on locally worked out social relationships explaining
local demographic developments.
In another way the Hajnal line and linking of demographic change to regional
differentiation got also a huge blow from Princeton (where Hajnal also worked) in the
frame of the fertility transition project. This international project led by Ansley Coale on
the basis of micro regional data challenged most of the assumptions of the original
demographic transition theory, where industrialization, urbanization were key factors in
explaining the shift from high fertility to low fertility. Instead they argued for a cultural
diffusion model in which literacy and the knowledge of contraceptive techniques play a
crucial role and the transition can be explained via getting connected to such streams of
cultural diffusion.
From this point on there have been several attempts to revitalize the Hajnalian
Este/West fault line (Coleman, van de Kaa, see Melegh 2006), but basically this could
never return as a key explaining factor. In demography itself more and more culture,
individual decisions and values came to the forefront to explain variations of very low
fertility figures and partnership decisions (Leesathage, Őri-Meleg, Spéder)

Conclusion: demographic regions and historical change

The three hundred year long debate, conceptual history of demographic regions
certainly have not got their end. Nonetheless we can safely argue that the differentiation
in nuptiality and most importantly in fertility has lost its power by the end of the 20th
century. There are several factors behind this complex history.
The most important one is the global decline of fertility, which would certainly amaze
and shock the thinkers of the 18th century, who like Montesquieu and Süssmilch were
firm believers of ever growing populations and relatively high fertility. But even Malthus
who explicitly formulated the biopolitical equitation of resources and population would
be outraged to see that fertility has been and is declining with a almost complete
detachment of marriage and fertility, which link was crucial in the moral geography of
the 18th and 19th century (Tomaselli 1988).
This idea of moral control was later given up and between the two World Wars and even
after the war in the 1950s it gave way to political techniques of liberal versus
conservative/fascist versus populist political ideas of control which referred to, but
basically sublimated various versions of morality. This was the period when the
intensifying fight over resources between blocks and countries led not only the horrors
of large scale wars, but also brutal and coercive policies of fertility control either for the
increase or the decrease firmly contextualized into the interplay of local and global
hierarchies (the targeted groups were either internal “threats” like the paupers,
imbeciles, various competing ethnic groups etc and/or external threats like the
“population bomb” of the Third World. These debates were global and ideas of regions
served as points in global mapping and global positioning. These ideas although
following internal logics and used intellectual heritages were in a constant interplay with
each other and they cannot be understood without these interplays.
From the 1960s and most importantly from the 1980s ideas of regions based on
differential fertility and family formation have been severely attacked from various
angles and positions and basically they have been deconstructed. It seems that with the
convergence of fertility at very low levels (at least by global historical scales) and detached from nuptiality this demographic process has become much less important from the point of view economic and political competition of regions, states and communities. Furthermore the eugenic and other attempts to control of family and childbearing behavior were politically challenged after the revelation of the inhumanity of colonial, Nazi, communist or Western liberal population controls. Colonial and fascist/conservative genocides, experimenting, communist/nationalist anti-abortion, plus forced migration campaigns and various other repressive techniques used by for instance by Western family planners in the Third World, all led to the questioning of demographic regimes as ultimate aims for political interventions. Thus overall models themselves are less and less legitimate areas of scientific research especially with regard to fertility and nuptiality. Mortality, morbidity and genetic variations are major issues today together with migration.

Economic reproduction within this global competitive framework is now less interested in utilizing these conceptual heritages and it is more and more focusing on migration and migratory regions, as areas which need to be observed and of controlled to serve competitive geopolitical and geoeconomic interest. Migration has always been important process in the biopolitical coordination, but it seems that future historians and social scientists need to say more how it has spatially and socially organized.

Beside the overall demographic processes there have been other factors in shaping and then in deconstructing various forms of demographic regions. In the 18th century there were only almost anecdotic evidence of variations and historical change of demographic and family behaviour. Malthus used rather “tragic” travel accounts even Le Play had just a limited number of interviews. Between the two world wars statisticians were already rather well equipped and used various sources and had rather well developed measurement techniques. They were also supported (many times misinformed) by ethnographers and anthropologists, but still some of the basic issues of comparison were just raised but not solved yet (the comparison of indices by regions and other communities). The real boom of demography came only in the 1950s, when it was seen as a major research area for poverty and through this to political orientation. This boom was so strong (the most important institutes were formed at that time) that social historians soon formed an alliance with demographers and historical demographers and started producing a huge number of case studies, historical statistics and digging into sources on a massive scale. This it is of no accident that the emerging empirical evidence questioned the validity of major regional models and imposed homogeneity on past societies crumbled into pieces and led to for instance micro histories, which tendency was also supported by the ongoing diversification, specialization of social and human sciences.

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